Notes for call with Jon and Andres 03/10/2017

Re: Current Version of Paper

p 4

Joseph Nye has been doing some work on soft power and one of his observations is that Putin understands influence and information warfare as means of achieving foreign policy objectives, calling it soft power; whereas, in the typology of the paper and of the US this behavior is a lot closer to non-military coercion[[1]](#footnote-1)

p 7

on maintaining the letter of the law – Putin sent Vladislav Surkhov (fan of non-linear war, presidential advisor, alleged architect of Russia’s East Ukraine activities, and propagandist) to Kaliningrad to meet with Victoria Nuland to negotiate “diplomatic solutions” to the Crimea annexation – *ex post facto*![[2]](#footnote-2)

p 14

on raising cost of grey zone conflict prompting initiator to stop without risking escalation – could we link this idea to the table of cases and show how the counterfactual of accession to NATO and EU for Georgia and Ukraine – as planned – might have exceeded Russia’s tolerance for risk, and caused cessation of grey zone hostilities?

p 16

clarifying the difference between an initiator being driven by deterrence vs efficiency – Georgia should be disaggregated into two phases to draw this out:

grey zone – signified by paramilitary and cyber operations

kinetic – invasion and acquisition of territory

Other

Duration variable correlates closely with NATO membership and geography – Galeotti thinks that Russia may only escalate – i.e. with military incursions – once conditions are made suitable by means of grey zone ops: pretexts, misinformation, disorder, and local allies[[3]](#footnote-3)

Geography appears to (partly) explain resilience against information operations; that is, near abroad states have historical experience with Russian methods and have begun building resistance in a way analogous to better computer network defence.[[4]](#footnote-4)[[5]](#footnote-5)[[6]](#footnote-6) Maybe enduring rivalry tells us something about the interaction (cf. Wilkenfield)

*REFLEXIVE CONTROL THEORY - group is systematically supplied with (dis)information designed to provoke reactions that are predictable and, to Russia, politically and strategically desirable*[[7]](#footnote-7)

1. Joseph S. Nye, “Information Warfare Versus Soft Power by Joseph S. Nye,” Project Syndicate, May 9, 2017, https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/cyber-warfare-weakens-russia-soft-power-by-joseph-s--nye-2017-05. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Bureau of Public Affairs, Department Of State, “Daily Press Briefing,” U.S. Department of State, January 15, 2016, //2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2016/01/251318.htm. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Mark Galeotti, “NATO and the New War: Dealing with Asymmetric Threats before They Become Kinetic,” *In Moscow’s Shadows* (blog), April 26, 2014, https://inmoscowsshadows.wordpress.com/2014/04/26/nato-and-the-new-war-dealing-with-asymmetric-threats-before-they-become-kinetic/. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Eerik-Niiles Kross, “Putin’s War of Smoke and Mirrors,” POLITICO, April 9, 2016, http://www.politico.eu/article/vladimir-putin-war-smoke-and-mirrors-russia-occupation-crimea-ukraine/. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Piret Pernik, “Russia Walks the Line Between War and Peace in the Baltics,” *The Cipher Brief* (blog), March 19, 2017, https://www.thecipherbrief.com/russia-walks-the-line-between-war-and-peace-in-the-baltics. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Ann Simmons, “Russia’s Meddling in Other Nations’ Elections Is Nothing New. Just Ask the Europeans.,” LA Times, March 30, 2017, http://www.latimes.com/world/europe/la-fg-russia-election-meddling-20170330-story.html. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Kross, “Putin’s War of Smoke and Mirrors.” [↑](#footnote-ref-7)